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Abstract

This project investigates the relationship between guilt and moral compensation, or
pursuing morally positive behavior following morally suspect behavior. Additionally, the
current research seeks to examine whether interpersonal, relational motives or
intrapersonal, self-focused motives drive this relationship. In Study 1, participants
recalled a moral transgression or a neutral memory; they then rated their guilt and
completed a compensatory monetary donation task (or vice versa). Guilt was lower after
the compensatory task, particularly for participants who had recalled a transgression,
suggesting that compensatory behavior can mitigate guilt. Pre-compensatory guilt also
significantly predicted the decision to donate. Study 2 manipulated the anonymity of both
the transgression and the compensatory opportunity in order to probe the interpersonal
versus intrapersonal mechanisms of guilt and moral compensation. Guilt and donations
were higher for known than unknown transgressions, but were unaffected by
compensation anonymity, supporting both interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms.
The link between transgression anonymity and donations was fully mediated by guilt,
indicating that guilt motivates subsequent compensatory behavior. Together, the results
of these studies illustrate that guilt affects and is affected by compensatory behavior.
Further research may help clarify the mechanisms behind this relationship.

Keywords: moral compensation, guilt, prosocial behavior, moral inconsistency
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Guilt and Moral Compensation: Relational or Self-Presentational?
One area of acute tension in human moral decision making is in the conflict
between wanting to be moral and wanting to benefit from the advantages of acting
selfishly or immorally. On the one hand, people often strive to be moral, as immoral
behavior leads to a jeopardized self-image, judgment by others, and in some cases,
punishment (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). Yet, on the other hand, immoral
behavior—such as cheating, stealing, and acting selfishly—can lead to immediate reward
(Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). The tension between these competing incentives can lead
to moral inconsistency; people attempt to benefit from immoral behavior while
maintaining a moral self-image, thus engaging in both kinds of behavior (Mazar, Amir, &
Ariely, 2008).
Two manifestations of this moral inconsistency are moral licensing and
compensatory behavior. In the case of moral licensing, people feel licensed or entitled by
previous moral behavior to do something immoral. Acting morally or even recalling
previous moral behavior can license a variety of subsequent negative behaviors, including
committing selfish acts, making questionable consumer choices, and acting on politically
incorrect or racist intuitions (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). For example, if someone
acts generously, they may be more likely to act selfishly later on, even if the context or
situation is different.
Such moral licensing effects have been demonstrated by several studies. Monin
and Miller (2001) found that giving participants the opportunity to demonstrate lack of
prejudice led to more prejudiced decisions later on. In one study, participants had an
opportunity to disagree with blatantly sexist statements (e.g., ―Most women need a man
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to protect them‖) or ambiguously sexist statements (e.g., ―Some women need a man to
protect them‖), or they received no statements at all. Men who received the blatantly
sexist statements—and thus, had the greatest opportunity to demonstrate their opposition
to sexism—were subsequently more willing to favor hiring a man for a stereotypically
male job than were men who received ambiguous statements or no statements. In this
instance, the opportunity to disagree with sexist statements licensed making sexist
decisions later on.
Further demonstrating the moral licensing account, licensing behavior also
emerges in domains that differ from those of the preceding moral behavior. For example,
one study revealed that participants who recalled a past moral action indicated less
likelihood of engaging in unrelated prosocial activities (e.g., donating blood, volunteering
at a homeless shelter, etc.) than those who recalled a past immoral or neutral action
(Jordan, Mullen, & Murninghan, 2011). Thus, moral licensing is a robust phenomenon,
occurring even when the original licensing behavior has nothing to do with the
subsequent immoral behavior. It is important to note, however, that while people may be
motivated to act immorally or to compensate as a result of recalling past actions, this
motivation may not be conscious. For example, Khan and Dhar (2006) found that
participants who were licensed failed to recognize this licensing effect. Students
committed to helping a classmate subsequently donated less money to charity than those
who were not given a licensing opportunity. However, when asked to justify their
donation choice, participants did not identify that the prior task impacted the amount they
chose to donate.
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This subconsciously driven moral inconsistency is also evident in the form of
compensatory behavior (DeCremer, 2009). Compensatory behavior occurs in instances
where the pursuit of immoral behavior motivates the pursuit of positive behavior. In
these cases, people pursue moral behavior following morally suspect behavior as if to
compensate for their moral transgression. Like licensing, compensatory behavior is a
well-established phenomenon that occurs in a variety of contexts. For example, Jordan et
al. (2011) found that participants who recalled their own previous immoral behavior
cheated less in a computer task than those who recalled their own moral behavior.
Furthermore, those who recalled their own previous immoral behavior showed more
persistence with the task—i.e., answered more questions before beginning to cheat—than
did those recalling their own moral behavior.
Research conducted by Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) augments the literature on
compensatory behavior by indicating that compensatory behavior can indirectly manifest
itself in a decreased desire for physical cleansing, which symbolizes moral purification.
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006), who examined the relationship between threatened
morality and physical cleansing, found that people who recalled immoral acts had a
greater desire for physical cleanliness, which can function as a surrogate for moral
purification. Those who recalled their own immoral acts recalled more cleanliness-related
words as compared to those who recalled neutral or moral acts. Additionally, participants
who copied a story about an immoral act showed a greater preference for cleaning
products than those who recalled moral acts. These tendencies are indicative of this
overall desire to compensate or fix a past transgression, as according to compensatory
behavior.
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Guilt and Moral Compensation
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) also found that compensatory behavior might
regulate the experience of negative emotions such as guilt and shame. Their findings
showed that engaging in physical cleansing (a form of moral purification) after recalling
or reading about an immoral act not only reduced participants‘ willingness to volunteer
but also their moral emotions, including guilt and shame. Furthermore, while the
compensatory act of hand washing reduced moral emotions, it did not influence nonmoral emotions, suggesting a unique relationship between compensatory behavior and
specifically moral emotions. In particular, the reduction of guilt through physical
cleansing after the recollection of an immoral act suggests that compensatory behavior
may reduce guilt. Additionally, the fact that moral emotions and the desire to volunteer
were both reduced by moral cleansing suggests that the mechanisms motivating these
changes might be similar.
These findings are indicative of the larger role that emotions play in moral
decision making. Moral emotions link internal standards and moral intuitions to
subsequent behaviors (Ghorbani, Liao, Çayköylü, & Chand, 2013, Greene & Haidt,
2002); neuroimaging studies, as well as studies of individuals with brain damage, show
that emotion and affective intuition are primary drivers of moral judgment (Greene,
2008). For example, Greene (2008) found that classically cognitive brain areas (e.g., the
anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and classically emotion-related areas (e.g., the
amygdala) are both activated when people consider moral dilemma cases. While all
emotions provide a motivational tendency, particular emotions, such as anger, shame, and
guilt are especially relevant to moral behavior (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Such moral
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emotions may moderate the link between moral standards and moral decisions, ultimately
affecting moral behavior.
These individual emotions elicit specific motivations, serving different emotional
functions (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). Anger, for example, plays a role in morally
inconsistent behavior in that it causes people to judge others more harshly while
simultaneously relaxing judgment of themselves (Hemenover & Zhang, 2004). For
example, a study conducted by Polman and Ruttan (2012) found that when participants
who recalled an experience that made them angry were given the opportunity to allocate
money to cancer research, they donated less money than participants in the neutral
condition and urged others to donate more money than those in the neutral condition.
Thus, angry people showed a decrease in their own moral behavior while expecting
others to act more prosocially than themselves.
Conversely, emotions such as guilt and shame have been found to function as
self-conscious emotions, raising awareness of one‘s own transgressions (Tangney,
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Much of the research focused on distinguishing shame from
guilt indicates overlap between these emotions. For example, analyses of personal shame
and guilt experiences recalled by adults and children revealed little difference between
the types of events that elicit shame and guilt (Tangney, Steuwig, & Mashek, 2007).
Furthermore, empirical research has shown that shame and guilt are equally likely to be
experienced in the presence of others. These emotions do differ, however, in the role of
the self in these experiences and in their utility in motivating reparative behavior
(Tangney, 1995). While shame emphasizes the self (i.e., in thinking, ―I am a bad
person.‖), guilt usually relates to a specific behavior (i.e. in thinking, ―I did a bad
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thing.‖). In this way, shame motivates a hyper-focusing on the self that makes one less
likely to focus on repairing the hurt or pain caused to another person; guilt, on the other
hand, sparks other-oriented empathy, driving restorative actions (Tangney, 1995). In
addition, proneness to shame is correlated with proneness to feelings of outwardly
directed anger and hostility, while guilt is not; a study of young adults showed that the
tendency to experience shame was significantly positively correlated with measures of
trait anger, while proneness to guilt was negatively or negligibly correlated with anger
and hostility (Tangney, 1995).
These findings suggest that guilt may play a unique role as an emotional
motivator of compensatory behavior. Compensatory behavior is driven by a desire to
make up for past transgressions (Ghorbani, M., Liao, Y., Çayköylü, S., & Chand, M.,
2013). Guilt can serve as a signifier for these moral violations, motivating reparative
behavior (Eisenberg, 2000; Haidt, 2003). Yet, anger allows people to maintain a high
sense of moral self-worth, creating entitlement to transgress, and shame is correlated with
trait anger and fails to motivate compensatory action (Polman and Ruttan, 2012;
Tangney, 1995).
Past research examining the role of guilt in cooperation further indicates that guilt
can play a role in compensatory behavior (Ketaleer & Au, 2003). Ketaleer and Au (2003)
found that feelings of guilt can spark cooperation in a social bargaining game. In their
study, participants who reported guilty feelings after making selfish offers in an
ultimatum game were more likely to act cooperatively and make generous offers when
re-playing the game up to a week later. In contrast, those who did not report initially
feeling guilty continued to pursue selfish strategies a week later. This difference in action
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based on guilt feelings seems to show that when guilt arises, it motivates positive
behavior. Such findings are suggestive of a relationship between guilt and compensatory
behavior, whereby guilt provides motivation to compensate for past misdeeds.
Other evidence further supports the connection between guilt and compensatory
behavior by indicating that guilt plays a role in motivating compensatory behavior on
behalf of in-group members. In a study by Gino, Zu, and Zhong (2009), participants
observed an in-group member (a confederate in a UNC shirt, the school that all
participants attended) or an out-group member (a confederate in a Duke shirt, a rival
school) act selfishly in a dictator game in the presence of an out-group member (another
confederate in a Duke shirt). Participants were instructed that they were each partnered
with someone in the other room (a room in which, in reality, students were completing an
entirely different study) and that they had $10 to decide (without any input from their
partner) to allocate between themselves and their partner. Individuals were told that they
could offer their partner any portion of the $10, from nothing to the entire amount. Those
in the in-group selfish condition left more money for their partner than those in the outgroup selfish condition, as if to compensate on their in-group member‘s behalf. In a
follow-up study examining the mechanism behind participants‘ restitutional acts, Gino et
al. (2009) found that participants who were asked to imagine viewing the selfish behavior
of an in-group member reported feeling more guilty about the person‘s selfish behavior
than the participants in the out-group selfish condition. Furthermore, self-reported guilt
by the participant was a predictor of the amount of money a participant chose to donate.
The fact that guilt was associated with the magnitude of participants‘ donations clearly
implicates guilt as a motivating factor in compensatory behavior.
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Mechanisms Motivating Guilt and Compensation
Gino, Zu, and Zhong‘s (2009) findings in combination with Ketaleer and Au‘s
(2003) evidence demonstrates that guilt impacts compensatory behavior. These studies
indicate that guilt can motivate compensatory cooperation and prosocial behavior after
committing morally suspect behavior or after observing an in-group member acting
selfishly. However, what is unclear is how and why this relationship exists.
Although the existing literature implies that guilt motivates compensatory
behavior, the mechanisms behind this motivation have not been investigated. In what
specific contexts are guilt and compensatory behavior linked, and what do these differing
contexts tell us about when and why guilt leads to compensatory behavior? Are there
specific contexts in which this relationship does not hold? As a result of this scant data,
potential contextual restrictions or limitations to this relationship are unclear.
Additionally, the current research focuses primarily on how guilt might motivate
compensatory behavior and there has been little research on how compensatory behavior
affects guilt. While the fact that guilt motivates compensatory behavior suggests that
compensatory behavior might subsequently affect guilt, this directionality of the guilt and
compensatory behavior relationship has not been tested or confirmed.
In order to fully understand the relationship between guilt and compensatory
behavior, it is important to more closely examine the theoretical explanations for each
phenomenon. Ongoing debates over the mechanisms that drive both guilt and
compensatory behavior focus on two broad potential mechanisms: one that is relational
(i.e., driven by interpersonal motivations) and one that is self-presentational (i.e., driven
by intrapersonal motivations). Both of these perspectives suggest that guilt and
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compensatory behavior allow for the regulation of moral and immoral behavior such that
one can accrue the benefits of acting morally while avoiding penalties for transgressions.
However, these perspectives differ in what they identify as the potential penalties for
transgressions committed without compensation. The interpersonal perspective identifies
that acting immorally can negatively affect someone by causing them to be viewed as
immoral by others or by negatively impacting their relationships with others. In contrast,
the intrapersonal perspective holds that immorality can lead to a compromised sense of
self-worth or a damaged self-image.
Interpersonal Compensatory Behavior
According to one view, moral behaviors are driven by our desire to preserve
relationships and to be seen positively by others. This perspective holds that status
promotion, which occurs when others publicly view one‘s moral behavior, is the primary
motivator for moral actions. Thus, such a perspective can be considered an interpersonal
theory of moral behavior. Evidence for this theory comes from the fact that individuals
behave the most morally when in the presence or imagined presence of others (Bateson,
Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). Public contexts not only heighten morality, but can even
prevent moral licensing from occurring. In the context of compensatory behavior, this
manifests itself as a desire to retain a good reputation by making up for past
transgressions.
A study conducted by Greene and Low (2014) demonstrated the interpersonal
nature of moral behavior by examining the effect of recalling past behavior on
evaluations of hypothetical moral transgressions in public and private settings. Greene
and Low (2014) looked specifically at moral licensing, but their findings connote how
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interpersonal mechanisms may work in the context of compensatory behavior. In the
experiment, individuals showed a typical licensing effect, whereby they reported being
more likely to transgress, and they viewed transgressions as more permissible, after
recalling past moral behavior. However, this licensing effect disappeared when the
transgressive behavior was conducted in public. In other words, the presence of others
and the opinion of others is so important that it can cause one to refrain from acting
licensed in the first place. This finding suggests that the public or private context of a
transgression can make a difference such that public transgressions are more detrimental,
as the opinion of others is of the utmost importance. If public awareness of a
transgression increases its salience—to a point where moral licensing no longer even
occurs—then it suggests that relationships and reputation are of utmost importance in
moral decision making. A similar relational perspective may likewise explain
compensatory behavior; compensatory behavior could be fueled by this heightened
awareness of moral transgression in a situation where an outside party was affected or
observed the initial moral transgression. According to this view, people engage in
compensatory behavior to reduce a negative reputation, rather than to preserve their own
self-worth.
Intrapersonal Compensatory Behavior
While interpersonal theory claims that a desire to preserve relationships and
public reputation drives moral behavior, intrapersonal theory holds that moral behavior is
driven by a desire to preserve one‘s own self-image. According to this theory, people
compensate in order to restore their own self-image, which is constructed based on
perceptions of one‘s own morality (Dunning, 2007). In the context of compensatory
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behavior, intrapersonal theory holds that an initial immoral action compromises a
person‘s self–worth, subsequently motivating them to pursue self-restorative moral
action.
A study conducted by Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin (2009) demonstrates that
compensatory behavior may indeed be driven by intrapersonal mechanisms. Participants
were asked to write a short story about themselves or about someone they knew using
either negative or positive trait words. After completing the written task, participants had
the opportunity to donate part of their compensation to charity. Among participants who
wrote a story about someone they knew, donation behavior did not differ depending on
the trait words used in the story (negative vs. positive). However, participants who wrote
a self-relevant story about their own negative traits donated five times as much as those
who wrote a self-relevant story about their own positive traits. Thus, donation behavior
was specifically influenced by reflection on one‘s own traits, with negative reflection
creating the greatest need to compensate. The absence of a compensatory effect when
participants wrote about others implies something other than interpersonal mechanisms at
work. While interpersonal theory would suggest that writing negatively about others
might induce a need to compensate—given the relational implications of writing
negatively about someone—this was not the case. Rather, it was self-image, and thus
intrapersonal factors, that fueled compensatory behavior.
Intrapersonal Guilt
In a similar fashion, intrapersonal theory proposes that guilt drives subsequent
actions that can restore one‘s self-worth. This theory, like the interpersonal theory, still
maintains that guilt is a reparative moral emotion. However, the intrapersonal account
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suggests that guilt drives any reparative action that will make one feel better about
oneself, not just actions that will repair one‘s relationship with others. Consistent with
this notion, a series of studies by de Hooge (2012) demonstrate that even when a
transgressor‘s damage is repaired by someone else, the transgressor‘s guilty feelings,
reparative intentions, and prosocial behavior diminish.
In all five experiments, participants read about transgressing someone (e.g.,
borrowing someone‘s bike without permission and having it stolen) and were then asked
about their own prosocial behavior and repair motivation (e.g., how much money they
would spend on a birthday present for the person they transgressed). Participants read
about restoring the transgression themselves, having a third party restore their
transgression (e.g., by finding the original stolen bike), or not having the transgression
restored at all. de Hooge (2012) found that guilt, repair motivation, and prosocial
behavior were equally low when the transgression was restored, regardless of whether it
was restored by oneself or by a third party. If guilt serves an interpersonal function, then
repair motivations should have remained high when a third party repaired the
transgression. Given that, in contrast, repair motivations decreased when someone else
did the repairing, it seems that preserving the relationship is not as crucial as the overall
alleviation of guilty feelings. Thus, de Hooge‘s (2012) data supports the intrapersonal
theory of guilt—that guilt motivates us to repair our own self-worth.
Interpersonal Guilt
The intrapersonal account of guilt is complicated, however, by other evidence that
supports interpersonal mechanisms. According to the interpersonal theory of guilt, guilt is
intended to preserve relationships and motivates us to act in order to preserve these
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relationships. Guilt—along with shame, embarrassment, and pride—is seen as a selfconscious emotion elicited by others‘ negative moral judgments (Tangney, Stuewig, &
Mashek, 2006).
According to Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994), guilt serves to
reinforce social bonds and is strongest and most common when one transgresses against
relationship partners. Autobiographical accounts support such an interpersonal function
of guilt. In one study, for example, participants who were asked to provide
autobiographical accounts of times when they felt guilty almost solely described
interpersonal incidents, with very few accounts referring to solitary transgressions
(Tangney, 1992). In another study, participants who wrote a story about feeling guilty
were more likely to convey high regard or esteem for the victim, as compared to those
who wrote about not feeling guilty (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995).
Additionally, communal relationships—such as those with family members or romantic
partners—were more commonly discussed in the guilty stories than in the neutral stories.
These repeated references to close relationships imply that guilt is interpersonal in nature,
arising in relational contexts. Furthermore, those recounting guilty stories were more
likely to report apologizing or making an effort to reconcile with the victim, thus
illustrating that guilt is generally intended to fuel reparative actions.
Connections between Guilt and Compensatory Behavior
Considering that guilt motivates reconciliation and reparative action, it is possible
that guilt can specifically motivate compensatory behavior (Haidt, 2003). Guilt is
implicated in compensatory contexts as an emotional motivator, leading to greater
cooperation and greater likelihood to compensate on behalf of a group member (Ketaleer
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& Au, 2003; Gino, Zu, and Zhong, 2009). However, there is a gap in the literature with
regards to the directionality of this potential relationship. Past research has not explicitly
investigated if guilt affects and drives compensatory behavior, if compensatory behavior
affects or mitigates guilt, or if both effects occur. Previous research has mostly looked at
correlational data, examining guilt either before or after compensatory tasks, rather than
comparing how guilt may change over time.
Furthermore, the mechanisms behind guilt and compensatory behavior, which
hint at a relationship between the two, are debated. Research on both guilt and
compensatory behavior have yielded conflicting views about whether each of these
phenomena is driven by a desire to preserve relationships or a desire to preserve one‘s
own self-image. While some data suggests that guilt occurs overwhelmingly in contexts
where close relationships are violated (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994) , other
data suggests that repair motivations decrease when someone else repairs for you,
indicating that preserving one‘s self-image, not one‘s relationships is most important (de
Hooge, 2012). Similarly, in some cases, compensatory behavior has been shown to
increase in the presence of others (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006), while in other
cases, it appears to occur primarily when self-reflection leads to a compromise in one‘s
self-worth (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009).
Given these conflicting mechanistic accounts and the lack of research regarding
the ways in which compensatory behavior and guilt may affect each other, it is unclear
how exactly guilt and compensatory behavior are related, and whether interpersonal or
intrapersonal factors may be driving this relationship. The present research seeks to
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answer these questions, elucidating how guilt affects and is affected by compensatory
behavior, and what mechanisms are behind this relationship.
In Study 1, the basic relationship between compensatory behavior and guilt was
explored using a memory recall manipulation and a compensatory task. Participants were
asked to recall either a moral transgression or a neutral experience, and they subsequently
had an opportunity to donate a portion of bonus money to charity. Participants reported
their level of guilt either before completing this compensatory task (pre-compensatory) or
afterward (post-compensatory). Examining the difference in guilt across these conditions
has the potential to shed light on the way in which guilt both affects and is affected by
compensatory behavior. In particular, if guilt plays a role in compensatory behavior, then
thinking about a past moral transgression should lead to larger donations then recalling a
neutral event, and this pattern should be mediated by reported guilt. Additionally, if
compensatory behavior reduces the experience of guilt, then post-compensatory guilt
should be weaker than pre-compensatory guilt.
If guilt and compensatory behavior are related to each other, then the question
remains as to what forces drive this relationship. Study 2 will seek to answer this question
by looking more closely at the interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms that
potentially drive guilt and compensatory behavior.
Study 1
Method
Participants. 328 participants (201 males, 126 females, and 1 transgender
person) ages 18-63 (M=30, Mdn=28) completed the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk,
a crowdsourcing internet marketplace in which people participate in online tasks in
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exchange for monetary compensation. Participation was restricted to residents of the
United States. All participants received $.35 for their participation; they could receive up
to an additional $.20 as a bonus during the compensatory task.
Design. A 2 (order: pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory) x 2 (recall:
transgression vs. neutral) between-subjects design was used in which participants were
randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects conditions and subsequently had an
opportunity to engage in compensatory behavior in the form of donating money. The
order variable manipulated whether guilt was assessed before the compensatory task (precompensatory) or after the compensatory task (post-compensatory).
Materials. The initial distractor task contained four questions about probability
and was adapted from Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer (2001). (See Appendix A for
questions).
Guilt was manipulated by asking participants either to recall an experience in
which they made someone angry and felt bad afterwards (transgression) or to recount
their typical Tuesday (neutral) as modeled after Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton
(1994), and Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011), respectively. (See Appendix B for
full prompts).
Guilt was assessed with a modified version of the Momentary Emotional States
Measure (Peeters et al., 2008). Participants were asked ―How do you feel right now?‖,
followed by a series of emotions evaluated with a 7-point scale, ranging from ―not at all‖
to ―very.‖ The scale included a mix of eight positive and negative emotions taken from
Peeters et al.‘s (2008) original set of 16. (See Appendix C for modified Momentary
Emotional States Measure). Although guilt was the only relevant emotion, the other
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seven emotions were included to mask the primary aim of assessing guilt.
As modeled after Sachdeva et al. (2009), compensatory behavior was assessed as
the amount of a small bonus ($.20) that participants decided to donate to charity.
Procedure. All participants completed the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Each participant provided consent and was assured that their data would be recorded
anonymously. All questions were optional so as to ensure that a participant could opt out
of a given question or the entire experiment at any time. To prevent demand
characteristics, participants were informed that the study was examining the relationship
between numerical literacy and memory recall.
All participants first completed four probability problems, which served to
reinforce the false premise of the study. There was a three minute time limit for this task.
Following this task, participants were randomly assigned to one of two recall
conditions. Participants in the transgression condition recalled and wrote about an
experience in which they made someone angry and felt bad afterwards; those in the
neutral condition recalled and wrote about their typical Tuesday. Both groups spent three
minutes on the recall task, after which they completed both the emotion questionnaire and
the compensatory task. In the compensatory task, participants received a 20 cent bonus
for their participation and had the option to donate any amount of the bonus to the
American Cancer Society.
Half of the participants in each recall condition completed the emotion
questionnaire first and then the compensatory task (pre-compensatory) and the other half
completed these tasks in the opposite order (post-compensatory).
Results
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A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA examined whether guilt differed as a function
of recall (transgression vs. neutral), order (pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory), and
their interaction. There was a main effect of recall, such that guilt was greater in the
transgression condition (M =3.24, SD =2.05) than the neutral condition (M = 1.70, SD =
1.27), F (1, 326) = 19.03 p<.001, η2=.190. There was also a main effect of order, such
that guilt was higher before the compensatory task (pre-compensatory M=2.76, SD=2.05)
than afterward (post-compensatory M=2.13, SD=1.58), F (1, 326) = 15.44 p<.001,
η2=.046. The recall x order interaction was significant, F(1, 326) =19.03 p<.001, η2=.056,
revealing that difference between pre- and post-compensatory guilt was far greater in the
transgression condition than the neutral condition (see Figure 1).
Examination of compensation showed that the distribution was non-normal.
Although participants could select any option between 0 and 20 cents (via a sliding bar),
98% of responses were either 0 or multiples of 5; over half of the responses were 0.
Because of this unusual distribution, compensatory responses were re-coded into two new
variables. The donation decision variable simply represented whether participants chose
to donate nothing (i.e., 0 cents) or something (i.e., any amount from 1 to 20 cents). The
donation amount variable represented the magnitude of donation decisions; given that
nearly all donations were made in multiples of 5, donations of 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 cents
were re-coded as values of 0-4, respectively (any original donations that were not
multiples of 5 were rounded up).
A logistic regression predicting decision to donate by condition showed a
significant effect of condition (Wald=5.25, p<.05) such that people decided to donate
more often in the transgression condition (43%) than in the neutral condition (30%).
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However, condition did not significantly predict donation amount (F(1, 325)=2.25,
p=.135, µ=.007). This inconsistency across ways of assessing donations seems to be
explained by the fact that among people who did donate, donations were descriptively,
although non-significantly, higher in the neutral condition (M=2.15, SD=1.00) than in the
transgression condition (M=1.99, SD=.97), p>.1.
Pre-compensatory guilt was a significant predictor of donation decision
(Wald=6.45, p<.05) indicating that higher ratings of guilt were associated with a greater
inclination to donate. A linear regression analysis revealed that pre-compensatory guilt
was likewise a marginally significant predictor of donation amount (ß=.14, t(162) = 1.78,
p = .077).
Although Study 1 was concerned specifically with guilt, participants were also
asked to report how energetic, anxious, happy, distractible, irritated, talkative, and tense
they felt before or after completing the compensatory task. Separate ANOVAs examining
these pre-compensatory emotions revealed that anxiety, happiness, irritation, and
tenseness differed significantly by condition (All Fs>4.33, all ps<.039). However, none
of these emotions significantly predicted either donation decision (all rs<.057) or
donation amount (all rs<.051). Additionally, donation decision and donation amount
were not significantly correlated with any post-compensatory emotions (All rs<.114 and
all rs<.099, respectively).
Discussion
This initial study sought to examine the relationship between guilt and
compensatory behavior. More specifically, by looking at guilt before and after
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compensation, Study 1 sought to determine how guilt both affects and is affected by
compensatory behavior.
People who recalled a time when they angered someone felt guiltier than those
who recalled a neutral experience. This finding is consistent with previous research,
which suggests that recalling experiences of angering or hurting someone can trigger
guilt (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).
As expected, pre-compensatory guilt was lower than post compensatory guilt,
indicating that compensatory behavior can reduce the experience of guilt. Guilt was
mitigated by compensation more in the transgression condition than in the neutral
condition, indicating that this relationship between guilt and compensatory behavior
might have limiting conditions. In the neutral condition, pre-compensatory guilt was
already very low. It is possible that participants‘ guilt in this condition was so low that it
could not be decreased any further. Alternately, it is possible that the ―baseline‖ guilt that
someone feels in their everyday life—rather than guilt explicitly related to a specific
experience—cannot be mitigated or otherwise affected by compensatory behavior.
Although those in the transgression condition decided to donate more often than
those in the neutral condition, donation amounts were only marginally predicted by guilt.
This finding may be explained by the nature of compensatory behavior. Compensatory
behavior is intended to allow one to benefit from immoral behavior (e.g., .keeping money
for oneself rather than donating it), while maintaining a moral self-image (e.g., alleviating
the guilt of acting immorally) (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Therefore, if the mere act
of donating is enough to alleviate guilt, then guilt may only drive someone to perform
this minimal compensation. According to this principle, in the context of the present
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experiment, a person would be expected to donate the smallest amount possible to
achieve compensation. If, for example, donating less than five cents is effective at
alleviating guilt, people may donate up to five cents and nothing more. In doing so, the
person benefits by not only decreasing their guilt but also by keeping most of the bonus.
Thus, this finding may be indicative of the way in which guilt and compensatory
behavior are related; guilt may drive someone to compensate, but only enough to resolve
the guilt.
The results of Study 1 suggest a relationship between guilt and compensatory
behavior, but do not provide concrete evidence as to the extent of or foundation for this
relationship. In particular, Study 1 was limited in its ability to determine the mechanisms
behind guilt and compensatory behavior; guilt and compensatory behavior were only
evaluated in an interpersonal context as all participants in the transgression condition
were asked to recall a time when their actions affected someone else. Study 2 seeks to
remedy this by comparing guilt and compensatory behavior across interpersonal and
intrapersonal contexts.
Study 2
Study 1 provided evidence for a relationship between guilt and compensatory
behavior, suggesting that transgressing can lead to guilt, and that the subsequent
compensatory behavior can assuage this guilt. These findings reveal that guilt both
affects, and is affected by, compensatory behavior. The question, however, of what
drives this relationship remains unanswered. As described earlier, it is unclear whether
guilt and compensatory behavior are driven primarily by interpersonal or intrapersonal
motivations. While interpersonal motivations include the desire to be perceived morally
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by others and to preserve relationships, intrapersonal motivations include wanting to
preserve one‘s own self-image and self-worth.
Study 2 therefore seeks to more closely examine these mechanisms, aiming to
distinguish between the interpersonal and intrapersonal accounts.
According to the interpersonal theory of compensatory behavior, status promotion
is the primary motivator for moral actions and occurs when one‘s morality is publicly
viewed (Greene & Low, 2014). This theory suggests that public knowledge of one‘s
actions is particularly important, as the opinion of others is the primary concern. This
account would predict that transgressors who act immorally in public or with the
knowledge of others should fuel a stronger desire to compensate than those who act
immorally in a private setting. Furthermore, public transgressions should fuel more guilt
than private transgressions, potentially contributing to this greater desire to compensate.
In contrast, the intrapersonal theory holds that public knowledge is irrelevant, as
the motivator for acting morally after committing a transgression is to restore one‘s own
self-worth. Thus, according to the intrapersonal theory, the public nature of a
transgression should make no difference in either the level or guilt or the desire to
compensate.
Study 2 relies on this public versus private distinction in order to examine the
interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of compensatory behavior. In this study,
participants‘ compensatory donation behavior was either publicly disclosed (published in
an organization‘s newsletter) or it was anonymous (published in the newsletter without
donor information). If compensatory behavior is primarily driven interpersonally, then
participants should donate more in the disclosed condition than in the anonymous
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condition. However, if compensatory behavior is driven intrapersonally, then the
anonymity of donations should not affect people‘s desire to donate.
To look more closely at the interpersonal vs. intrapersonal nature of guilt, Study 2
also manipulates the anonymity of the transgression itself. Participants read a scenario in
which their transgression would be known, or in which it would be unknown. According
to interpersonal theory, guilt is intended to preserve relationships and is inspired by a
self-consciousness derived from the judgment of others. If guilt is primarily driven by the
judgment of others, then a known transgression should elicit more guilt than an unknown
transgression. Alternately, the intrapersonal theory predicts that the anonymity of a
transgression should not affect guilt levels.
As in Study 1, Study 2 also varies whether participants reported their guilt before
completing the compensatory task (pre-compensatory) or afterward (post-compensatory).
Thus, the interpersonal theory—but not the intrapersonal theory—predicts that the
anonymity of both the compensation and the transgression will affect guilt and
compensatory behavior, but in a nuanced way. In particular, the effect of compensation
anonymity should depend on the transgression anonymity; whereas unknown
transgressions should elicit similar donation behavior regardless of whether the
compensation occurs anonymously versus publicly, known transgressions should elicit
greater donations when public than when anonymous. In other words, the interpersonal
theory predicts an interaction between compensation anonymity and transgression
anonymity, such that known transgressions would lead to more donations than unknown
transgressions and that disclosed donations would be more effective than anonymous
donations in addressing this desire to compensate, particularly for known transgressions.

Guilt and Moral Compensation

26

A similar interaction should likewise emerge for ratings of guilt, such that guilt
should show greater mitigation from public donation than from anonymous donation,
particularly for known transgressions.
Overall, then, the interpersonal theory predicts that both guilt and compensatory
behavior will be higher for initial transgressions that are known rather than unknown.
Given the role of guilt in driving compensatory behavior—as established by Study 1—
Study 2 will test a mediational model of this relationship. This model assesses whether
the relationship between transgression anonymity and compensatory behavior is mediated
by feelings of guilt. If found, a mediation effect would demonstrate that guilt affects
compensatory behavior.
Method
Participants. 496 participants (317 males, 177 females, and 2 gendernonconforming or undisclosed gender participants) ages 18-74 (M=31, Mdn=28) were
recruited for this study via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participation was limited to
residents of the United States. All participants received $.35 for their participation.
Design. A 2 (transgression: known vs. unknown) x 2 (compensation: known vs.
anonymous) x 2 (order: pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory) between-subjects
design was used in which participants were randomly assigned to one of eight betweensubjects conditions.
Materials. All participants imagined themselves as the actor in a scenario in
which they volunteer for a non-profit organization and accidentally delete some of the
organization‘s important and irreplaceable data. In the known transgression condition,
participants learned that they would be directly implicated as the transgressor (the
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supervisor was the only other person with access to the deleted data). In the unknown
transgression condition, participants learned that they would not be identifiable as the
transgressor (since many others had access to the deleted data; see Appendix D for the
complete scenarios).
In the compensatory task, participants had an opportunity to compensate for their
mistake by donating a portion of a recently received $200 bonus back to the organization.
Participants selected one of seven specified monetary amounts ($0, $5, $10, $20, $50,
$100, $200) to donate. In the known compensation condition, participants learned that all
donations are disclosed and published with the donor‘s name in the organization‘s
monthly newsletter. In the anonymous compensation condition, participants learned that
all donations are published anonymously in the monthly newsletter (See Appendix E for
compensatory task).
Guilt was assessed, along with seven other emotions, in the same manner as in
Study 1.
Procedure. All participants completed the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Each participant provided consent and was assured that their data would be recorded
anonymously. All questions were optional so as to ensure that a participant could opt out
of a given question or the entire experiment at any time.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the known or unknown
transgression condition. They were instructed to read the scenario carefully and to
imagine themselves in the situation. After reading the scenario, participants completed
both the emotion questionnaire and the compensatory task; in the latter task, participants
were randomly assigned to have an opportunity for known vs. anonymous compensation.
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Half of the participants in each transgression condition completed the emotion
questionnaire before the compensatory task (pre-compensatory), while the other half
completed these tasks in the reverse order (post-compensatory).
Results
Donation (the measure of compensatory behavior) statistics and analyses were
conducted using an interval scale. Initial donation data was collected on an ordinal scale.
However, participants‘ responses were treated as respective monetary values (e.g., $0, $5,
$10) rather than as the original ordinal scale values (e.g., 1, 2, 3).
A 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA examined whether guilt differed as a
function of transgression (known vs. unknown), compensation (known vs. anonymous),
order (pre-compensatory vs. post-compensatory), and their interactions. There was a
main effect of transgression such that guilt was greater in the known transgression
condition (M =5.29, SD =2.29) than the unknown transgression condition (M = 4.83, SD
= 2.38), F (1, 486) = 6.07, p <.05, η2=.012 (see Figure 2). Additionally, there was a main
effect of order by which pre-compensatory guilt (M= 5.67, SD=2.06) was greater than
post-compensatory guilt (M= 4.44, SD=2.45), F(1, 486)=38.30, p<.001, η2=.073. There
was no main effect of compensatory task; guilt did not differ as a function of whether the
compensation was known (M =5.16 , SD =2.30) or unknown (M =4.96, SD =2.38),
F(1,486)<1.0. Moreover, there were no significant interactions (All Fs<2.02, all ps>.15).
A 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA was also conducted to examine compensatory
behavior, as measured in money donated. This analysis specifically explored whether
donations differed as a function of transgression condition (known vs. unknown) and
compensatory task condition (known vs. anonymous) as well as their interaction. There
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was a main effect of transgression such that donations were higher for known
transgressions (M =116.91, SD =90.55) than unknown transgressions (M = 85.84, SD =
85.4), F (1, 494) = 15.19, p<.001, η2=.030 (see Figure 3). As with the guilt analyses,
there was no main effect of compensatory task condition, F(1, 494)=.158, p=.691,
η2=.000 nor was there a transgression x compensation interaction, F (1,494)=.742,
p>.389, η2=.002.
Thus, transgression predicted both donation and guilt. Furthermore, precompensatory guilt was correlated with donation, indicating that the more guilt someone
felt, the larger their subsequent donation (r(243)=.303, p<.001). Because all three
conditions held, a mediation analysis examined whether pre-compensatory guilt mediated
the relationship between transgression and donation. Only pre-compensatory guilt was
examined, given that the analysis was concerned with assessing whether guilt affects
subsequent donations.
Running a mediation model with a 95 percent confidence interval and 10,000
bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2013) showed that there was a significant indirect effect of
transgression influencing donation by virtue of pre-compensatory guilt (p<.05, z=-2.38).
Furthermore, when the mediating effect of pre-compensatory guilt was accounted for, the
link between transgression and donation was no longer significant (p=.094). Thus, precompensatory guilt fully mediates the relationship between transgression anonymity and
compensation.
As in Study 1 an examination of pre-compensatory non-guilty emotions revealed
that some emotions differed significantly by condition. Specifically, participants in the
known transgression reported feeling more anxious, irritated, and tense and less happy
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than those in the unknown transgression condition (All Fs>7.47, all ps<.011). Moreover,
pre-compensatory irritation, tenseness, and anxiety were all positively significantly
correlated with donation amount and pre-compensatory happiness was negatively
significantly correlated with donation amount (All rs>.178). Additionally, donation
decision and donation amount were significantly correlated with post-compensatory
anxiety, happiness, distractability, irritability, and tenseness (All rs>.128).
Discussion
Study 2 sought to replicate the findings from Study 1 that guilt motivates
subsequent compensatory behavior, and that the opportunity to engage in such behavior
can mitigate guilt. Study 2 also sought to extend these findings by examining the
candidate mechanisms for guilt and compensatory behavior, distinguishing between
interpersonal and intrapersonal factors.
As expected, Study 2 showed that compensatory behavior decreased guilt. People
felt less guilty after compensating than those who had not yet engaged in compensatory
behavior. Study 2 also revealed that guilt was mitigated equally in the unknown and
known transgression tasks. Although the mitigation effect on guilt in Study 1 differed
across conditions, the consistent mitigation effect in Study 2 may have arisen because
guilt was high in both of the transgression scenarios. In contrast, participants in the
neutral condition in Study 1 may not have had enough guilt in the first place to
experience a subsequent mitigation.
The patterns of guilt ratings suggested that those whose transgression was known
felt more guilty than those whose transgression was unknown. This finding was
congruent with the interpersonal theory of guilt. Because interpersonal guilt is primarily
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driven by the way in which others see oneself, feelings of guilt should be higher when
others know about one‘s wrongdoings or mistakes. This pattern contrasts with the
intrapersonal account, which holds that guilt is self-focused; if guilt was self-focused, the
anonymity of a transgression should not have made a difference, and people whose
transgression was unknown should have felt equally guilty as those whose transgression
was known.
Interestingly, the anonymity of donations did not affect guilt. This is juxtaposed
with the finding that the anonymity of the transgression significantly affected guilt. If
guilt is interpersonal—as the effect of transgression anonymity suggests—then
anonymity of the donation should also make a difference, with disclosed donations
mitigating guilt more than anonymous donations. The fact that this was not the case
supports an alternative view of guilt, which holds that guilt is more intrapersonal, and is
about having the transgression repaired rather than about having the transgressor
themselves repair the wrong and preserve a relationship (de Hooge, 2012). These two
findings—that donation anonymity did not affect guilt, while transgression anonymity
did—are in apparent contrast to one another and require further reconciliation. Potential
interpretation of this incongruence will be discussed further in the General Discussion.
Donation behavior largely mirrored patterns of guilt. In particular, anonymity of
the donation itself did not affect the amount people chose to give. Donations differed,
however, based on transgression condition, such that known transgressions elicited
greater donation than did unknown transgressions. Furthermore, the link between
transgression condition and donation behavior was fully mediated by guilt: known
transgressions led to greater guilt, which in turn led to greater donations. This
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mediational effect of guilt, which was expected, suggests that guilt is not only affected by
compensatory behavior, but also affects compensatory behavior.
General Discussion
Compensatory Behavior Mitigates Guilt
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 indicate a relationship between guilt and
compensatory behavior such that compensatory behavior can reduce guilty feelings. In
both studies, guilt decreased after compensation. This is supported by previous research
suggesting that compensatory behavior has an effect on guilt. For example, the finding
that compensatory behavior can reduce guilty feelings is congruent with Zhong and
Liljenquist‘s (2006) research that indicates the reduction of guilt by physical cleansing (a
physical form of compensation). Furthermore, the present study augments previous
research; previous studies have suggested that guilt can motivate cooperation and
compensation, but have not examined how this compensation subsequently affects guilt.
Ketaleer and Au (2003) found that guilt motivated compensatory cooperation following
previous uncooperative actions in a social bargaining game, but did not examine guilt
post-cooperation. In the present study, recording guilt before and after compensatory
tasks allowed for a comparison of guilt that demonstrates a decrease in guilt postcompensation, and ultimately suggests that compensatory behavior can mitigate guilt.
It is important to note that in Study 1 in particular, compensating decreased guilt
even when the compensation had nothing to do with the source of guilt. Participants
recalled a wide variety of transgressions, including hurting others, cheating on partners,
and emotionally hurting or disappointing other family members. Yet, despite the
irreparability of some of these transgressions, participants who recalled a transgression
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chose to donate money to the American Cancer Society (as part of the experimental
compensatory task) more often than those who recalled a neutral transgression. The fact
that participants chose to donate despite this incongruency suggests that guilt may lead to
token behavior, such that guilt motivates a compensatory behavior, but not necessarily a
behavior equivalent to the original action.
According to Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, and Strongman (1999),
moral inconsistency is driven by a desire to benefit from acting selfishly while also
maintaining one‘s moral reputation or self-worth. Thus, someone is most likely to take
the action that allows for the greatest possible material reward while also preserving their
reputation or self-worth. In the case of the current experiment, the only compensatory
opportunity participants had was to engage in a minor, unrelated prosocial behavior. If
such behavior cannot preserve one‘s self-worth, then people would not have been
motivated to donate, as it would have done little for their self-worth or reputation and
would have caused them to incur a cost; donating, in this case, would have caused a
decrease in material reward while not accruing any benefit. However, given that
participants did donate money, it is possible that minor, token prosocial behavior can
alleviate guilt, and in this particular case, allowed the participant to both reap the benefit
of material reward (by keeping part of the bonus) and the benefit of preserving their
reputation or self-worth (by decreasing guilt).
In Study 1, although people donated more often in the transgression condition,
among people who did donate, the amount that they donated did not differ across
condition. This may be explained by the idea that moral inconsistency is driven by a
desire to benefit from acting selfishly while also maintaining one‘s moral reputation or
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self-worth. It is possible that when participants did choose to donate, they were still
donating very little, in order to keep the costs of compensating low. Given these small
donation amounts, the actual amount that participants donated may have been based more
on individual differences than on the transgression manipulation, as donation behavior
can be significantly affected by the way in which personal values align with
organizational values (Bennet, 2003).
Guilt Affects Compensatory Behavior
In both Study 1 and Study 2, guilt was also found to motivate compensatory
behavior. In Study 1, pre-compensatory guilt was a significant predictor of donation
decision, such that greater guilt predicted a greater likelihood to donate. Furthermore,
Study 2 showed that guilt not only directly affected compensatory behavior (such that
greater guilt led to larger donations), but also fully mediated the relationship between
transgression anonymity and compensation. This mediation effect demonstrates that guilt
can directly and indirectly affect compensatory behavior.
Analysis of the correlation between compensatory behavior and postcompensatory emotions in Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that guilt may not be unique in
driving compensatory behavior. Several additional emotions significantly differed across
neutral and transgression conditions, and across known and unknown transgression
conditions in Studies 1 and 2, respectively.
Previous examinations of moral behavior indicate that a variety of emotions affect
moral hypocrisy by altering the judgments of one‘s own moral behavior or the judgments
one makes of others‘ moral behavior (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). For example, Polman and
Ruttan‘s (2012) findings that anger increased moral hypocrisy and envy reversed moral
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hypocrisy demonstrate that emotions as a whole are crucial to understanding
compensatory behavior. It is therefore unsurprising that the current study revealed a
correlation between such emotions as irritation, happiness, and tension, and
compensatory behavior.
Past studies also indicate that guilty feelings are closely related to other emotions
in a pattern similar to that demonstrated in the current experiment. In an experience
sampling method, Baumeister, Reis, and Delespaul (1995) found that guilt feelings
among adults were positively correlated with aversive arousal states and were negatively
correlated with pleasant arousal states. In the present study, tension and irritation, which
are negative arousal states, were higher among those in the known transgression
condition than in the unknown transgression condition, and happiness, a positive arousal
sate, was lower in the known transgression condition than in the unknown transgression
condition (Haidt, 2003). These findings are expected given the initial prediction that
guilt would be higher among those in the known transgression condition than in the
unknown transgression condition. In cases where guilt is thought to be negatively
correlated, i.e., in the case of positive arousal states, positive emotions were rated lower
than guilt. In cases where guilt is thought to be positively correlated, i.e., in the case of
negative arousal states, negative emotions were rated similarly to guilt. Thus, these other
emotional findings do not necessarily weaken the relationship between guilt and
compensatory behavior. Rather, they indicate that other emotions may be affecting
compensatory behavior in conjunction with guilt.
Post-compensatory guilt was similar among those who donated and those who did
not donate. This was contrary to the hypothesis that guilt would be lower after donating.
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However, this null effect may not rule out the possibility that compensatory behavior
reduces guilt. It is still possible that an individual‘s decision to donate may have reduced
their guilt, but that the between-subjects nature of the guilt measurement was unable to
assess this possibility.
Interpersonal or Intrapersonal?
Findings regarding the mechanisms behind guilt and compensatory behavior were
less clear in that although known transgressions led to higher guilt and thus higher
compensation, the public nature of the compensatory task did not affect guilt or
donations.
The fact that a known transgressor both felt more guilty and donated more money
than an anonymous transgressor seems to imply that there may be interpersonal
mechanisms motivating guilt and compensation. According to interpersonal theory, status
promotion, which occurs when others publicly view one‘s moral behavior, is the primary
motivator for moral actions. Public transgressions thus create more negative feelings than
transgressions committed without public knowledge because there is a greater
opportunity for judgment by others (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). In the case of the
current experiment, those whose action was known by others may have felt guiltier and
donated more due to this very reason.
This evidence for interpersonal mechanisms is complicated, however, by the fact
that anonymity of the compensation did not make a difference in guilt or donations. If the
presence and judgments of others mattered, then there would have been an effect of
compensation anonymity such that public donations were larger, and had a greater ability
to mitigate guilt. Yet, findings were more in line with intrapersonal mechanisms.
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Intrapersonal theory holds that guilt drives any reparative action that will make one feel
better about oneself—public or private (de Hooge, 2012).
Previous research examining non-interpersonal ways to combat guilty feelings
suggests a way of reconciling these two findings. A study conducted by Inbar, Pizarro,
Gilovich, and Ariely (2013) demonstrated that people will sometimes atone for
transgressions by harming themselves. In the study, participants who recalled a guiltinducing event were more willing to inflict unpleasant electric shocks on themselves than
those recalling sad or neutral events. Guilt was also subsequently decreased after
administering the shocks. In the case of Inbar et al‘s (2013) experiment, transgressions
induced self-harm, despite not necessarily being self-focused transgressions. It is possible
that in the present experiment, although guilt and compensation were driven by
interpersonal behavior, they were able to be alleviated intrapersonally.
This idea, that guilt and compensation, while sparked by interpersonal
mechanisms, can be alleviated by the self, is also supported by Nelissen and Zeelenberg
(2009), who found that when opportunities for compensation are not present, guilt can
evoke self-punishment. Participants read a situation in which they failed exams, thus
incurring extra costs for university on behalf of their parents. While this situation in and
of itself was interpersonal in nature, Nelissen and Zeelenberg (2009) found that
participants who were unable to repair the transgression (i.e., had to wait until the next
academic year to take the course), inflicted self-punishment in the form of self-denied
pleasure in a scenario study and inflicted self-enforced penalties.
Nelissen and Zeelenberg‘s (2009) study has some similarities to the present study
in that a given participant was only presented one way to repair a transgression. In the
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present study, participants were forced to either donate anonymously or publicly. If given
the choice, participants may have preferred to make public donations, thus providing
evidence for the interpersonal theory of compensation and guilt. However, when only
given one option, they may have donated equal amounts under both conditions because it
was the only method of alleviating guilt.
Limitations
Hypothetical scenarios vs. recall. Although there was a strong mediation effect
of guilt in Study 2, guilt was only a marginally significant predictor of donation amount
(such that greater guilt led to higher donations) in Study 1. These findings may be
explained by the difference in experimental designs across the two studies. While
participants in Study 1 were making decisions about donating real money, Study 2
presented an entirely hypothetical compensatory task. It is possible that it was easier for
people to compensate in Study 2 than in Study 1, given the hypothetical nature of the
compensation. This difference in design may explain the fact that guilt was only a partial
predictor of compensatory behavior. Previous research has found that real moral
decisions can contradict moral decisions made in hypothetical scenarios (Ajzen, Brown,
& Carvajal, 2004). For example, in a study conducted by Brown, Azjen, and Hrubes
(2003), college students voted in a referendum to contribute a certain amount of money to
a scholarship fund in either a hypothetical or a real payment context. Votes to make
payments above $1 were up to 48% higher in the hypothetical condition than in the real
condition. A similar effect may have occurred in the present experiment, confounding the
ability of guilt to predict donations. It is possible that people donated differently in Study
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1 because real money was at stake, and there was a higher threshold of guilt necessary to
motivate donations.
Individual differences. One alternative explanation as to why guilt did not
accurately predict the amount of money donated is that money itself can be very context
dependent. In the context of Amazon Mechanical Turk, money is spare and participants
can get paid less than $2 an hour (Harris, 2014). Thus, the 20 cent bonus allocated as a
possible compensatory donation, may have been considered quite large, and might have
made participants weary of donating money. Additionally, there may have been other
factors keeping people from donating. For example, people may have had particular
qualms about donating to the specific charity (The American Cancer Society) in Study 1.
Previous research has shown that personal values and inclinations can powerfully
influence where people to choose to donate (Bennet, 2003). This complicates the way in
which donations to a particular charity can be read as indicative of emotions, rather than
personal inclinations.
Congruency. While the current studies demonstrate that compensatory behavior
alleviates guilt, the strength of this effect may have been underrepresented because of the
incongruency between transgressions and compensatory tasks. Study 1 forced a strong
incongruency; while participants recalled irreparable interpersonal transgressions,
donating a small amount to charity was the only compensatory option presented. In
contrast, Study 2, while presenting an irreparable transgression, presented a
compensatory option more closely related to the original transgression (i.e., the donation
was going back to the charity affected by the transgression).
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Furthermore, this incongruence may have weakened the ability of guilt to predict
compensatory behavior. A further investigation of behaviors elicited by guilt may help
elucidate whether guilt is an accurate predictor of compensatory behavior overall, or if
the link between guilt and compensatory behavior is context specific.
Future Investigation
Manipulating the transgression. Given the evidence supporting both
interpersonal and intrapersonal mechanisms of guilt and compensation, these mechanisms
may be worthy of further investigation. While the current study demonstrated that
transgressing knowingly increases guilt, a future experiment might look at whether
differences in familiarity with the person transgressed makes a difference. A study
conducted by Ghorbani, Liao, Çayköylü, and Chand (2013) examining hypothetical
ethical decisions regarding compensation towards flood victims of differing
psychological proximity demonstrated that increased psychological proximity can
increase guilt, shame, and compensatory behavior. In the study, participants reported the
highest levels of guilt, shame, and compensation when a victim in an imaginative
scenario was an in-group member, while the lowest levels of guilt, shame, and
compensation resulted when the victim was an abstractly described stranger. If
interpersonal mechanisms play a large role in guilt and compensation, as Ghorbani et
al.‘s (2013) findings suggest, then one would expect to see higher guilt and more
compensation in instances where a transgression involves a loved one than when it
involves a stranger.
Manipulating whether the initial transgression itself is interpersonal or
intrapersonal may help further clarify to what extent guilt and compensatory behavior are
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relationship-oriented. In the current studies, transgressions were interpersonal in nature.
In Study 1, participants were specifically asked to recall a time that their actions affected
someone else. Similarly, in Study 2, although the public nature of the transgression was
manipulated, in all cases, deleting the data impacted the organization, and thus, people
outside of the self.
It is possible that interpersonal transgressions—i.e. poor decisions that negatively
affect others rather than the self—elicit more guilt and a greater need to compensate than
intrapersonal transgressions. Previous research examining which types of harm play a
determining role in the experiences of guilt and regret found that guilt increased as
interpersonal consequences became more severe (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje, &
Manstead, 2004). In the study, participants read a scenario in which their decision (e.g.,
choosing to go on vacation during a family member‘s anniversary) had ramifications that
differed in the degree to which they caused self or interpersonal harm (e.g., at opposite
ends of the spectrum: the family members do not care but the holiday goes badly, or the
holiday goes well but the family members are disappointed). Guilt was found to increase
as negative interpersonal consequences increased.
In accordance with these findings, interpersonal transgressions could trigger more
guilt than intrapersonal transgressions. Accordingly, compensatory behavior could be
affected as well. If, as the present study suggests, guilt and compensatory behavior are
linked, and if compensatory behavior is itself interpersonally motivated, then it is
possible that interpersonal transgressions would elicit greater compensatory behavior as
well.
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Examining a variety of transgressions may also contribute to the literature on
compensatory behavior and guilt by indicating whether moral or conventional
transgressions are more or less likely to evoke guilt. Previous research has suggested that
transgressions can be categorized as either moral or conventional transgressions (Kelly,
Stitch, & Haley, 2007). According to this distinction, moral rules, such as those
prohibiting murder, have an objective and prescriptive force, while conventional rules,
such as dress codes, are arbitrary and situation dependent (Kelly, Stitch, & Haley, 2007).
According to the moral/conventional task paradigm, in which subjects are asked to judge
examples of prototypical moral and conventional transgressions, moral transgressions are
judged more severely across diverse age groups, nationalities, and religions (Kelly,
Stitch, & Haley, 2007). In the current study, this distinction was not of relevance; both
the transgression prompt and the scenario, in Studies 1 and 2 respectively, were designed
simply to elicit guilt and examine the effect of guilt on compensatory behavior. However,
coding responses to the transgression prompt in Study 1 based on transgression type may
help determine if moral or conventional standards are more often associated with guilty
feelings. It is possible that the nature of a moral transgression can either itself influence
compensatory behavior, or may influence compensatory behavior by way of guilt, such
that moral transgressions are more severe and thus evoke greater guilt and compensation.
The nature of compensation. Given the current study‘s focus on monetary
means of compensation, future investigation might look at other ways to mitigate guilt
that are less monetarily focused. Examining other compensatory tasks can reveal the
ways in which guilt affects different kinds of compensatory behavior and whether some
types of compensatory behavior are more guilt-driven than others. Additionally, further
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research can elucidate what it is about compensatory behavior that mitigates guilt and if
directly compensating for a transgression is more or less effective at mitigating guilt than
indirectly compensating for a transgression. More specifically, manipulating the
congruency between transgressions and subsequent compensation can further illuminate
the extent of compensatory behavior‘s ability to affect guilt. In the current study, guilt
was affected more by compensation in Study 2 than in Study 1. While study 2 offered a
more direct way to compensate—in the form of making a donation back to the
organization affected by the transgression—this kind of congruency did not exist in the
first task. Thus, it is possible that the greater congruency between transgression and
compensation, the more the compensation can mitigate guilt.
Using a within-subjects design. Additionally, examining guilt within-subjects
may uniquely contribute to understandings of guilt and compensatory behavior. Because
the current study examined pre-compensatory and post-compensatory guilt between
subjects, it is difficult to directly deduce the ways in which guilt may affect and be
affected by compensatory behavior. Examining an individual‘s guilty feelings overtime
may provide more information regarding how guilt fluctuations correlate to specific
actions. In particular, looking at an individual‘s guilt at the time of a specific guiltinducing event, versus looking at base-level guilt, can provide insight as to the ways in
which compensatory behavior may interact with guilt in certain contexts and over time.
The importance of continued research. The present research indicates that there
is, in fact, a relationship between guilt and compensatory behavior. In both studies, guilt
was lower after donating, suggesting that compensatory behavior can mitigate guilt.
Furthermore, guilt predicted the decision to donate in Studies 1 and 2. While the current
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study did not offer clear evidence as to whether interpersonal or intrapersonal
mechanisms drive guilt, the fact that the effect of transgression anonymity on donations
was fully mediated by guilt indicates that in the case of either mechanism, guilt motivates
subsequent compensatory behavior.
Continuing to examine the way in which moral emotions drive compensatory
behavior can only further our understanding of moral inconsistency and the source of this
enigmatic tendency. Such investigations can contribute to the greater literature regarding
why and how we make ethical and moral decisions, shedding light on the complexities of
human moral behavior.
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Figure 1: Self-reported guilt in transgression and neutral conditions reported before or
after performing a compensatory task in Study 1.
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Figure 2: Self-reported guilt in known and unknown transgression conditions reported
before or after performing a compensatory task in Study 2 in the a) known compensation
condition b) anonymous compensation condition

Donation ($)

Guilt and Moral Compensation
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

50

Known
Compensation
Anonymous
Compensation

Known Unknown
Transgression

Figure 3: Donations ($) in the known and unknown transgression and compensation
conditions in Study 2.
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Appendix A
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. You will have three
minutes to complete this portion of the questionnaire.

1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die, 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how
many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?
Number of times:

2. In the Big Bucks Lottery, the changes of winning a $10 prize are 1%. What is
your best guess about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1,000 people
each buy a single ticket from Big Bucks?
Number of people: (fill in the blank)

3. In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the change of winning a car is 1 in 1,000.
What percent of tickets of Acme Publishing Sweepstakes win a car?
Percent of tickets: (fill in the blank)

4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?
(1) 1 in 100
(2) 1 in 1,000
(3) 1 in 10

Guilt and Moral Compensation
Appendix B
(transgression) Please write about a time that you angered someone and then felt badly
about your actions.

(neutral) Please write about what you do during your average Tuesday.
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Appendix C
Items rated on a 7-point Likert scale from ‗not at all‘ to ‗very.‘
Please indicate how you feel in this particular moment
anxious
irritated
tense
guilty
distractible
energetic
happy
talkative

53

Guilt and Moral Compensation

54

Appendix D
Scenario instructions: Please read the following scenario carefully. As you are reading,
imagine yourself as the person in the story.
(UNKNOWN Transgressor):
For the last three months, you have been volunteering as a computer science intern at a nonprofit organization. You just received a $200 bonus for your hard work.
Motivated to do even more work for the organization, you decide to reformat the computer‘s
data system. Although the task is beyond your skill level, you know that updating the system
would really help the organization. In the process of trying to reformat the data system, you
accidentally delete the data before copying it all over, causing your organization to lose
irreplaceable data that has been collected over the past 30 years.
Since many people had access to this particular data, no one will know it was you who made
this fatal error.
(KNOWN Transgressor):
For the last three months, you have been volunteering as a computer science intern at a nonprofit organization. You just received a $200 bonus for your hard work.
Motivated to do even more work for the organization, you decide to reformat the computer‘s
data system. Although the task is beyond your skill level, you know that updating the system
would really help the organization. In the process of trying to reformat the data system, you
accidentally delete the data before copying it all over, causing your organization to lose
irreplaceable data that has been collected over the past 30 years.
Since only you and your supervisor had access to this particular data, it will be obvious that it
was you who made this fatal error.
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Appendix E
(UNKNOWN Compensatory task)
Now, think back to the scenario you read.
To try to make up for your mistake, you think about donating some of your $200 bonus back
to the organization.
It is the organization's policy only to accept anonymous donations; all donations are
published in the monthly newsletter, but without the donor's name.
How much do you donate?
($0, $5, $10, $20, $50, $100, $200)
(KNOWN Compensatory task)
Now, think back to the scenario you read.
To try to make up for your mistake, you think about donating some of your $200 bonus back
to the organization.
It is the organization's policy not to accept anonymous donations; all donations are published
in the monthly newsletter along with the donor's name.
How much do you donate?
($0, $5, $10, $20, $50, $100, $200)

